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Abstract: In this paper, I investigate the influence of tax incentives on the financial structures 
of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) conducted by multinational entities (MNE). Previous re-
search has already found evidence for tax avoidance by debt shifting. I analyze the importance 
of locating debt at holdings which own the operating firm. Placing debt at the level of the hold-
ing is more advantageous since it allows inter alia for debt financing up to the purchase price. 
Accordingly, by using firm-level data provided by the German Central Bank I show empirically 
that the probability that a firm is held by a holding in the same country increases with the tax 
rate in that country (though the effect is rather small). As a limitation, I find this effect only for 
a sample of all firms and no additional effect in case of M&As (denoted as M&A firms). Since 
this way of debt financing requires that interest payments of holdings are used to offset profits 
of the operating firms, I consolidate financial structures of holdings and the operating firms. I 
discuss theoretically and show with descriptive statistics that this consolidation – the major 
contribution of my paper – leads to a higher total debt ratio compared to the unconsolidated 
case. However, this effect can only be observed in particular for the subsample of those M&A 
firms which actually belong to such structures of holdings and operating firms and does not 
lead to an increase of the debt ratio in the sample of all M&A firms. Finally, I show that the tax 
sensitivity of external debt financing increases with the consolidation (though again with no 
additional effect in case of M&A firms). I conclude that those findings may be one explanation 
why previous studies have found relatively low effects of taxes on debt financing.  
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1. Introduction 
My paper focuses on tax avoidance in the context of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). M&As 
account for an increasing part of foreign direct investment (FDI) (48 percent in 2015, 
(UNCTAD, 2016)) and are therefore potentially relevant for tax planning in multinational en-
tities (MNE). Indeed, it is, e.g., shown that effective tax rates of formerly domestic targets de-
cline by around 3 percent after M&As (Belz, Robinson, Ruf & Steffens, 2013). Furthermore, 
Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that potential double taxation has an effect on the location of 
headquarters in MNEs after M&As.  
Targets are often not acquired directly but via holding structures. It is a question, whether this 
happens for tax reasons. Several papers have investigated, why operating firms are held via 
holdings. Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) show that so-called treaty shopping, i.e., the avoid-
ance of withholding taxes, is a relevant determinant of holdings. In addition, Lewellen and 
Robinson (2013) find that transaction costs and the reduction of tax payments through inter-
company loans are drivers of the use of holdings.  
Holding structures are also used to implement certain financial structures. From a tax perspec-
tive the interest tax shield should be allocated in a high tax location. Mintz (2004) shows that 
in this context so-called “double-dipping” can explain the use of holdings: Parent firms invest 
in operating firms via holdings. While the parent finances this investment by taking a loan, the 
operating firm receives its funds also as a loan from the holding. Whereas the holdings are 
located in countries where the interests from the operating firm are not considered as income, 
the interests may be twice deducted from the taxable profit.  
Another strategy is known as debt push down financing, i.e., loading debt on subsidiaries in 
countries with a high tax rate. In case of M&As, the debt may particularly be loaded at the level 
of a holding. This is advantageous since it allows for debt financing up to the purchase price 
(and not just the amount of total assets) (Ruf, 2011). Indeed, for German inbound investment, 
Ruf (2010) shows that debt is particularly shifted to holding companies. In line with that, he 
shows that a higher tax rate of the parent firm (i.e. a relatively lower tax rate of the firm) de-
creases the probability of the usage of a holding (Ruf, 2011). Another explanation could be, 
that debt-push-down strategies including the usage of holdings can particularly be used to cir-
cumvent thin-capitalization rules (Jacobs, 2011). Thin-capitalization rules are targeted against 
excessive debt financing, since they limit the deduction of interests from the tax base in case of 
excessive debt ratios.  
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I focus on financial structures set up through M&As. I consider German outbound FDI and 
thereby exploit more variation in the explanatory and control variables than previous studies 
that considered German inbound FDI. Considering outbound investment, my dataset – the Mi-
crodatabase Direct investment (MiDi) provided by the German Central Bank (Deutsche Bun-
desbank) – allows us to observe the complete chain of ownership including holding companies, 
since it is based on mandatory reporting from German MNEs. I will consider all FDI (i.e. also 
greenfield investment) and measure additional effects of firms which became FDI through 
M&As (in the following referred to as “M&A firms”; firms which follow from greenfield in-
vestment are denoted as “non-M&A firms”).  
Loading debt at the level of holdings may also explain why previous studies, which do not 
account for this kind of debt financing, have found relatively small tax effects on debt financing. 
Several papers have investigated how taxes affect debt financing in MNEs. Büttner, Overesch, 
Schreiber and Wamser (2011) find a positive effect of taxes both on internal and external debt. 
In addition, they find that, in case of adverse lending conditions, the tax sensitivity of the former 
is larger than the one of the latter. In a meta-study based on 46 primary studies, Feld, 
Heckemeyer and Overesch (2013) predict, as a consensus estimate, that the debt ratio (relative 
to total capital) increases by 0.3 percentage points if the tax rate increases by one percentage 
point, which seems to be a rather small effect.  
Several papers have made theoretical contributions or found empirical results which may ex-
plain the relatively small effects of the tax rate on the debt ratio. Excessive external debt financ-
ing may lead to debt overhang (too much debt may hinder attractive investment projects) or 
bankruptcy risks (Myers (1977), Kraus and Litzenberger (1973)). Furthermore, controlled for-
eign corporation rules (a common regulation of countries against tax avoidance), by immedi-
ately taxing income in low tax subsidiaries at the tax rate of the parent company, reduce the 
accumulation of internal debt financing in low tax affiliates (see, e.g., Altshuler and Hubbard 
(2003), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012)). Büttner, Overesch and Wamser (2011) find that the 
effect of taxes on the debt ratio is rather strong for firms with less capabilities to reduce their 
tax base through non-debt tax shields and for firms with a smaller probability to experience 
losses. Büttner, Overesch, Schreiber and Wamser (2012) show that thin-capitalization rules re-
duce internal debt shifting. Ruf (2011) finds that transfer pricing regulations, by restricting in-
terest rates, may also have a negative effect on debt financing. Egger, Keuschnigg, Merlo and 
Wamser (2014) find several reasons, which may explain the relatively small tax sensitivity: 
First, previous studies have not considered small firms which may increase the tax sensitivity 
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of the internal debt ratio to some extent. Second, they show that the tax sensitivity also increases 
if an empirical model is chosen which accounts for the boundedness of the dependent variable 
between zero and one. Third, they find that relative advantages to locating debt at alternative 
affiliates, reduces debt financing of a firm. Another explanation could be, that in case of thin-
capitalization rules and no strict transfer pricing regulations, the height of interests rather than 
the debt ratios are adapted (Schindler & Schjelderup, 2016). I however expect, that previous 
studies have also probably underestimated the effect of taxes on debt financing because they 
neglect the significant debt financing of holding companies and that it is necessary to consoli-
date financial structures of operating firms and holdings in order to measure the debt ratio more 
precisely.1  
My paper is organized as follows: in the following section, I start by developing relevant hy-
potheses for my research. In Sections 3 and 4, I then describe the identification strategy and the 
used data. Afterwards, I present my results. The paper ends with some concluding remarks.  
2. Development of Hypotheses 
I analyze how taxes affect the financial structures of M&As. I separate my analysis in two steps. 
First, I investigate, whether financial considerations and associated tax benefits determine 
group and in particular holding structures which emerge from M&As. As a second step, I in-
vestigate the effect of taxes on debt ratios and particularly account for debt-push-down strate-
gies including holdings. To be precise, I consolidate financial structures of operating firms and 
holdings located in the same host country before evaluating the tax influence on the debt ratio. 
Note, that in my empirical analysis I will always consider all firms and measure additional 
effects for M&A firms. The hypotheses will however be formulated for M&As in particular. 
2.1. Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
I start by investigating the effect of several determinants of group and holding structures im-
plemented in the course of M&As. Debt financing, which reduces the tax base, is especially 
relevant in case of a high corporate tax rate in the host country. In case of M&As, this debt 
should particularly be placed at the level of the holding, which leads to my first hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
1 Note, that whenever I refer to consolidation, I do not refer to the well-known meaning of consolidating financial 
statements of MNEs as a whole, but of consolidating those balance sheet positions of all subsidiaries of an MNE 
in each country which enter the calculation of the debt ratios.  
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H-1:  The tax rate of the host country has a positive effect on the probability that a firm 
is held indirectly by a holding in the same country. 
In order to offset the profits of the subsidiaries with the interest payments of the holding 
firms in the same country a group tax regime is necessary. Therefore I formulate the follow-
ing hypothesis: 
H-2:  The existence of a group tax regime in the host country has a positive effect on the 
probability that a firm is held indirectly by a holding in the same country. 
As mentioned above, an alternative explanation of the usage of holdings is treaty shopping, 
i.e., the avoidance of withholding taxes. In that case they would be located in intermediary 
countries. In accordance to that, I also test the following hypothesis: 
H-3:  The withholding tax rate of the host country has a positive effect on the probability 
that a firm is held indirectly by a holding in an intermediary country. 
Another driver of using a holding may be that there is a credit system in the headquarters 
home country (e.g., like in the USA). If the home country taxes exceed the tax credit, setting 
up a holding in an exemption country would be beneficial (Weichenrieder and Mintz (2008)). 
However, this is not relevant in my case, where I only consider subsidiaries of German 
MNEs and observations after 2004. Starting from 2001, Germany generally exempted for-
eign dividends. 
2.2. Considering Debt-Push-Down Strategies When Analyzing Capital Structure Choices 
In the second part of my analysis, I focus on the financial structures and in particular on debt 
financing of holding and target firms. First, I refer to previous literature that has already ana-
lyzed the tax effect in capital structure choices. Therefore, I attempt to confirm previous find-
ings about a positive relationship between the host country tax rate and leverage: 
 
H-4:  The tax rate of the host country is assumed to have a positive effect on the debt 
ratio. 
Unlike previous literature, my focus is on debt-push-down strategies by means of holding 
firms. I expect that previous literature has underestimated the effect of host country taxes on 
debt financing if the different entities of a holding structure are analyzed separately.  
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The following simple example may help to clarify this argument. Figure 1 illustrates an ex-
ample of a simple holding structure, where I have a target firm (Firm 2) which is owned by 
a holding in the same country (Firm 1). Let us suppose that the holding firm reports exclu-
sively financial assets, i.e., the shares of the target firm, and that no intercompany loans are 
used here. The target firm however invests the capital in fixed assets. 
Figure 1: Simple Holding Structure 
 
Firm 1 (Holding Firm): 
 
       
financial assets1,t  equity1,t 
 
liab1,t 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Firm 2 (Target Firm): 
  
 
fixed assets2,t equity2,t 
 
liab2,t 
 
 
 
Notes: The index of all balance sheet positions (i,t) includes the number of the firm before the comma (i) and the 
period after the comma (t). Liabi,t denotes the liabilities of the respective firm.   
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Traditionally the total debt ratio was calculated as the average of the ratios of debt to total 
capital (𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, i.e., 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎1,𝑡𝑡 respectively 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎2,𝑡𝑡): 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙2,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2,𝑡𝑡2  (1) 
 
I can compute the consolidated total debt ratio (CTDR) of the two entities as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 = (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙2,𝑡𝑡)(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐2,𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2,𝑡𝑡) (2) 
Note that I subtract 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2,𝑡𝑡 in the denominator because it is already included in 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡 and 
hence it would be counted twice. Because of goodwill the value of 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐1,𝑡𝑡 (the market value of 
Firm 2) may exceed 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2,𝑡𝑡 (the book value of Firm 2).  
This CTDR of both firms might differ from the average 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡 for the holding and the operating 
firm. The simple intuition is as follows. Since I subtract 𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒2,𝑡𝑡, the ratio increases.  
If there are multiple holding structures in one country, simple examples can show that the 
CTDR may be lower than the TDR if one holding structure is relatively large and has a low 
debt ratio. Hence, in the overall sample (not just M&A firms in countries with a high tax rate), 
the effect of a higher CTDR must not necessarily be observed. However, in case of debt-push-
down strategies the debt ratios should be similar across different aggregates (i.e., have the same 
height relative to the profits). If debt is used to reduce profits (and there are no financing con-
straints), there is no reason why this should only be conducted for some subsidiaries of an MNE. 
Still, for earlier investments debt-push-down strategies may not have already been conducted 
(if the MNE rather recently started to do tax avoidance). As mentioned above, in my empirical 
analysis I will consider also the overall sample of all firms and measure additional effects for 
M&A firms. As discussed above, in case of the latter, using holding structures is more likely. 
Hence, all of the following hypotheses should at least hold for M&A firms.  
I conclude that I expect a higher level of the CTDR compared to debt ratios measured for each 
single entity (at least in countries with a high tax rate where debt financing at the level of hold-
ings is attractive). 
 8 
 
H-5:  Measures for the debt ratio show higher levels of debt-financing if I consolidate all 
liabilities assigned to subsidiaries of an MNE located in the same country (at least 
in countries with a high tax rate).    
The consolidation, which allows us to observe the debt ratio more precisely, will presumably 
lead to a higher measured effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio. I therefore expect that 
previous literature has underestimated the tax effect on capital structure choices. 
H-6:  The effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio is larger compared to previous results if 
I consolidate subsidiaries with their holdings in the same country.    
If I consolidate financial information of all entities controlled by the same MNE in a certain 
host country, I can compute the ratio for total debt as well as similar measures for total inter-
company debt and total bank loans. I therefore further look at internal and external debt financ-
ing in particular. As for total debt financing, I also expect a stronger effect of the tax rate on 
those two ratios once I consider the consolidated financial items.  
H-7:  The effect of the tax rate on the internal debt ratio and the external debt ratio is 
larger if I consider consolidated financial items. 
3. Identification Strategy 
3.1. Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
In the following empirical part, I inter alia determine the probability that a firm is held by a 
holding. I estimate this probability with a logit model. For my first regression, I consider a 
dummy variable as my dependent variable that is equal to one if the firm is held indirectly by a 
holding in the same country (𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)) in the first year where it appears in 
the database. I only consider firms which are not holdings for firms in the same country them-
selves (though they may have subsidiaries in other countries). Expression (3) shows my empir-
ical approach, where 𝑓𝑓 denotes the respective firm: 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒)𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 (3) 
 
My variables of interests are the statutory profit tax rate in the host country of the firm (𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) 
as well as the existence of a group tax regime (𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎) in the host country. Since I am 
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particularly interested in the usage of holdings in case of M&A firms I interact both variables 
with the variable 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴, which is equal to one, if the firm has entered the database in such a way 
(and equal to zero if it has entered the database through greenfield investment). Furthermore, I 
also include the withholding tax rate 𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇 in the host country as an explanatory variable but I 
only expect an effect in the second regression which I will describe below and where I change 
the dependent variable. 𝑋𝑋 denotes a vector of country specific control variables. According to 
my hypotheses, I expect a positive effect for 𝛽𝛽6 and 𝛽𝛽7 (see hypotheses H-1 and H-2).  
For the second regression I now exchange the dependent variable by the variable 
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠. 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒) which is equal to one if there is a holding in an intermediary 
country.  
𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝐻𝐻 (𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠. 𝑐𝑐𝐻𝐻𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑒) = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 + 
𝛽𝛽5𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝐺𝐺𝑇𝑇 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝐻𝐻𝑓𝑓𝑠𝑠𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜀𝜀 (4) 
I now focus on the withholding taxes (𝑊𝑊ℎ𝑇𝑇). I expect a positive effect for 𝛽𝛽7 (see hypothesis 
H-3). 
3.2. Considering Debt-Push-Down Strategies When Analyzing Capital Structure Choices 
In this second step, I investigate the effect of taxes on financial structures. I refer to well-known 
strategies to identify a tax effect on the capital structure choice but I also consider consolidated 
debt ratios as a dependent variable. If I observe a positive effect of taxes on the probability that 
a firm is held via a holding (which – as explained in Section 2.2 – leads to higher debt ratios) 
in the regression as denoted in expression (3), then, on average, the consolidated debt ratios 
should be higher in countries with a high tax rate and hence the effect of the tax rate on the debt 
ratio should be higher in the consolidated case. 
For my basic set of regressions, I consider the total as well as the external and internal debt 
ratio as dependent variables. The total debt ratio 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 is defined as 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝑐𝑐𝑙𝑙𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  (see Section 
2.2 for the definition of the variables in the ratio). This differs only in so far from the debt ratio 
in expression (1) as a) there I consider the average of those debt ratios for the special case of 
two firms and b) now I also subtract current profits from total capital, since they may also be 
considered as equity. Different from that, the internal debt ratio 𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 considers only liabilities 
to affiliates and the parent of the firm. For the external debt ratio 𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, the difference between 
the total liabilities and those internal liabilities (i.e., the external liabilities) is divided by total 
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capital. Again I use 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇  and 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 as explanatory variables. However, different than in Section 
3.1, 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 is now assigned the value one for all subsidiaries of an MNE in a country, if one is a 
M&A firm. In addition, the variable 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 is defined equal to zero if no firm in the same MNE 
and country has entered the database through an M&A, but at least one through greenfield in-
vestment. Because of this sample design I consider only holding structures where at least one 
firm has entered the database in either of the two ways. However, the mode of entry is only 
given for firms which became FDI after 2004, so my sample is restricted to the time period 
2005 to 2014.2 Expression (5) shows the regression equation for the case of the 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇, where 𝑓𝑓 
denotes the respective firm and 𝑎𝑎 the year: 
𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (5) 
𝑋𝑋 is a vector of firm and country level characteristics. According to my hypothesis H-4 I expect 
a positive sign for 𝛽𝛽1. In this unconsolidated case, I do not assume an additional effect for M&A 
firms and hence I have no expectation about the sign or significance of 𝛽𝛽2. 
Furthermore, I consider the consolidated debt ratios as dependent variables, i.e., the consoli-
dated total debt ratio (𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇), the consolidated internal debt ratio (𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇) and the consolidated 
external debt ratio (𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). As can be seen from expression (2), they are basically constructed 
as in the unconsolidated case, but now generally as a sum of all the firms in each holding struc-
ture (including chains of subsidiaries) with the equity of the operating firms being subtracted 
in the denominator. However, different from the stylized case in expression (2), now also inter-
nal liabilities between the firms in the holding structure are subtracted in order to avoid double 
counts (they are generally subtracted from the numerator and the denominator of all three debt 
ratios, except from the numerator of the 𝐶𝐶𝐸𝐸𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇). Furthermore – as for the unconsolidated debt 
ratios – the debt ratios differ in so far from the debt ratio in Section 2.2 as now I also subtract 
current profits from total capital, since they may also be considered as equity. Finally, for sim-
plifying the aggregation, this consolidation is conducted for all affiliates in the same MNE and 
country, i.e., a common debt ratio is for example also constructed if there are multiple such 
structures (arranged in a parallel way) of one MNE in a country.  
                                                 
2 I need firms with a known mode of entry in order to identify differences between M&A firms and non-M&A 
firms. However, as mentioned above, we can observe the mode of entry only for new firms after 2004. It may be 
questioned whether new non-M&A firms may not enter holding structures with affiliates that are M&A firms. 
Hence the expected difference between M&A firms and non-M&A firms would be biased. However, this would 
be a downward bias and the actual results may even be stronger.  
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Expression (6) shows the example of the consolidated total debt ratio (which I again analo-
gously consider for the internal and external debt ratio):  
𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋 + 𝜃𝜃𝑖𝑖 + 𝜃𝜃𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 (6) 
The variables 𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴 and 𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 are defined as for expression (5). I also expect a positive effect of 
the tax rate on this debt ratio, i.e., 𝛽𝛽1 should be positive in expression (6). For H-6 and H-7, I 
assume a positive and significant effect of the interaction term (those are the cases, were holding 
structures are likely and hence the consolidation should lead to higher debt ratios in countries 
with a high tax rate). According to this reasoning, it should only be the firms belonging to a 
holding structure for which I observe this effect. Therefore, in additional regressions, I will only 
consider firms belonging to an MNE which has such a holding structure in the respective host 
country. 
Moreover, I will consider the potential influence of group tax regimes and thin-capitalization 
rules and further reduce the sample to firms which are located in countries with such rules. 
Regarding group tax regimes, the effect of the tax rate is supposed to be larger for firms located 
in countries with such regimes. Accounting for thin-capitalization rules is relevant since, as 
mentioned above, one purpose of using holdings may also be to circumvent those rules (Jacobs, 
2011). Accordingly, I also expect a stronger effect in case there are thin-capitalization rules in 
the host country (but rather on the internal debt ratio, which – different then the external debt 
ratio – has been found to depend on those rules (Büttner et al., 2012)). My dataset on thin-
capitalization rules does not distinguish between those rules and earnings stripping rules. Like 
thin-capitalization rules, earnings stripping rules are targeted against excessive debt financing. 
Whereas thin-capitalization rules limit the deduction of interests in case of excessive debt ratios, 
earnings stripping rules apply if the interest to earnings ratio exceeds a certain threshold. Ac-
cordingly I expect similar effects. 
4. Data 
I use firm data for multinationals from the MiDi database, which is collected by the German 
Central Bank (Deutsche Bundesbank). This database includes information on both FDI of Ger-
man MNEs (outbound) as well as FDI of foreign MNEs in Germany (inbound). I consider Ger-
man outbound FDI, which – as mentioned in Section 1 – allows us to exploit more variation.3 
                                                 
3 I exclude observations from mining, agriculture, non-profit and membership organizations because special tax 
regimes may be available there. Furthermore, I exclude firms from the financial services sector, for which special 
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Due to mandatory reporting, this database provides balance-sheet information on all FDI posi-
tions (subsidiaries) of German MNEs abroad.4 Furthermore I can observe chains of ownership 
including the holdings. MiDi provides panel data with information on the mode of entry (M&A 
project vs. Greenfield project), so I can observe the group structures over time, including the 
emergence of new subsidiaries through M&As. As mentioned above, my sample is restricted 
to the time period 2005 to 2014. I consider only fully owned subsidiaries so that the MNE has 
sufficient influence to conduct the described debt-push-down strategies.  
I consider investment in EU-countries and countries belonging to the OECD, excluding Ger-
many which is the country of the MNEs’ headquarters.5 My sample includes 1,842 observations 
for the regressions explaining the holding structures (this number is here also equal to the num-
ber of firms since I consider always only the first year per firm), 8,211 observations (2,335 
firms) for the regressions explaining the unconsolidated debt ratios and 6,442 observations 
(1,716 firms/holding structures) for the regressions explaining the consolidated debt ratios.  
The descriptions, means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis 
are listed in Tables 1 to 3. I generally use the dependent variables and variables of interests as 
described in Section 3. The selection of control variables is oriented on recent papers dealing 
with related research questions (see, e.g., Ruf (2011)). The variables of my first set of regres-
sions (i.e. for explaining holding structures) are listed in Table 1.  
Here I consider the dependent variables and variables of interest as defined in section 3.1, 
namely Holding (same country), Holding (interm. country), STR, GT Regime and WhT. Those 
explanatory variables are further interacted with the variable indicating M&A firms (MA), 
which is also considered separately. Regarding control variables, certain country specific fac-
tors may also have an impact on whether subsidiaries are held directly or via holdings (Dreßler, 
                                                 
regulations for the balance sheet structure apply, that may lead to biased results. Finally, I also exclude observa-
tions whose German parent is not an incorporated and legally independent entity, as well as subsidiaries which are 
not legally independent. In all those cases, I drop all observations of an MNE (in all years) in one country, since 
otherwise I might drop some firms from a holding structure whereas others remain which may bias the debt ratios.  
4 The mandatory collection is determined in the German Foreign Trade and Payments Regulation 
(Aussenwirtschaftsverordnung). The criteria, when an investment has to be reported varied over time. From 1999 
until 2001, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% or more and the balance-sheet total of the respective 
foreign investment exceeded 5 million Euros or if the participation was 50% or more and the balance-sheet total 
exceeded 500.000 Euros. From 2002 until 2006, FDI had to be reported if the participation was 10% or more and 
the balance-sheet total exceeded 3 million Euros. Since 2007 the threshold of 10% applies only for direct shares, 
whereas for indirect shares or a mixture of direct and indirect shares the threshold has been raised to 50% (for 
details see Schild and Walter (2016)). 
5 I exclude firms located in Iceland. The used database is confidential concerning information on individual firms 
and since there are only few German subsidiaries in Ireland, this has initially caused conflicts with this require-
ment. For further revision, it may be possible to include firms located in Iceland again. 
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2012). Therefore I include GDP, GDP per capita, Inflation and Corruption (measured by the 
Worldbank’s Control of Corruption index where higher values denote less corruption).  
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Regressions on Determinants of Holding Structures 
Variable Description Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
Holding (same country) Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is held 
indirectly by a holding in the same country in the first 
year where it appears in the database. 
0.163 0.370 
Holding (interm. coun-
try) 
Dummy variable that is equal to one if the firm is held 
indirectly by a holding in an intermediary country in 
the first year where it appears in the database. 
0.047 0.212 
Statutory profit tax rate 
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.280 
 
0.070 
MA Dummy variable, that is equal to one if the firm has en-
tered the database through an M&A by the reporting 
MNE (and equal to zero if it has entered the database 
through greenfield investment). 
0.713 0.453 
Group Tax Regime 
(GT Regime) 
The firm is located in a country with a group tax re-
gime. 
0.742 0.438 
Withholding Tax 
(WhT) 
Withholding tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.014 0.043 
GDP Gross Domestic Product in the firm’s host country; 
measured in billion USD. 
2,387.753 4,162.962 
GDP per Capita Gross Domestic Product per home country national in 
the firm’s host country; measured in USD. 
39,307.708 19,805.559 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s host country. 2.228 2.145 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in 
the firm’s host country. 
1.189 0.811 
Notes: The number of observations is 1,842. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s research Data and Service Centre (RDSC). Tax var-
iables are derived from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & Young. GDP, 
GDP per Capita, Inflation and Corruption stem from the World Bank. 
 
Whereas GDP and GDP per capita may increase the probability of holdings in the same country 
since they indicate the market size and purchasing power (and hence maybe profits which could 
be offset by interest payments) they may reduce the probability of holdings in an intermediary 
country, since high values of those variables may indicate well-established markets where firms 
are presumably rather directly held by the headquarters. Both, Inflation and Corruption may 
however be indicators of investment risks in the respective countries and are hence assumed to 
have opposite signs to the GDP measures in regressions explaining the usage of holdings in 
intermediary countries (for domestic holdings, I have no clear expectations). 
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Table 2 shows the variables for my second set of regressions (i.e. with the unconsolidated debt 
ratios as dependent variables). Here, I keep the tax rate as an explanatory variable and adapt the 
definition of the variable MA as stated in Section 3.2. In addition I include several variables at 
firm level which should affect the ability respectively willingness of firms to take loans, namely 
Loss Carryforward, Sales and Tangibility. I expect a negative sign for Loss Carryforward be-
cause if a firm carries forward losses, it has relatively low current profits and hence should have 
a lower incentive to reduce its tax base via a high debt ratio (see, e.g., MacKie-Mason (1990)). 
For the variable Sales different effects can be thought of. On the one hand, for large firms (i.e. 
firms with large sales) it is assumed to be easier to receive external debt financing (see, e.g., 
Graham and Harvey (2001)). On the other hand, large firms may typically be more mature and 
hence might rather finance themselves with retained earnings (Ruf, 2011). Whereas the first 
effect is only expected for external debt financing, the second effect may be relevant for both, 
internal and external debt financing. Hence I have no clear expectation concerning external and 
overall debt financing but assume that the internal debt ratio declines with Sales. Like Sales, 
also a high value of Tangibility (measured by fixed and intangible assets of the firm, divided 
by total capital (balance sheet total)) should increase the willingness of external lenders to give 
a loan. Hence, for this variable I expect a positive effect on the external debt ratio but no specific 
effect on the internal and total debt ratio. Furthermore, I consider GDP growth, which is a 
measure for potential profits (see, e.g., Huizinga, Laeven and Nicodeme (2008)) and should 
also increase the chance to receive a loan. Inflation serves as a measure for lending conditions 
because high inflation is usually associated with low interest rates, which should increase bor-
rowing. Finally, I again include Corruption, which – as stated above – takes a high value in 
case of low corruption and presumably has a positive effect on the debt ratios, since lenders 
may be eager to give loans rather to firms in more secure countries.  
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Regressions on Capital Structures 
Variable Description Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
TDR Liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (balance sheet 
total). 
0.510 0.264 
IDR Internal liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (bal-
ance sheet total). 
0.219 0.242 
EDR External liabilities of a firm, divided by total capital (bal-
ance sheet total). 
0.291 0.239 
Statutory profit tax rate  
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s host country. 0.274 0.070 
High STR The firm is located in a country with a tax rate above the 
75%-percentile of all countries. 
0.239 0.427 
MA Dummy variable, that is equal to one if any firm in the 
same MNE and country (though I consider disaggregated 
debt ratios here) has entered the database through an M&A 
by the reporting MNE (and equal to zero if no firm in the 
same MNE and country has entered the database through an 
M&A, but at least one through greenfield investment). 
0.729 0.445 
Group Tax Regime 
(GT Regime) 
The firm is located in a country with a group tax regime. 0.730 0.444 
Thin-capitalization or 
earnings stripping rule 
The firm is located in a country with a thin-capitalization 
or earnings stripping rule. 
0.836 0.371 
Holding structure The firm is located in a country, where it’s MNE has at 
least one holding structure. 
0.252 0.434 
Loss Carryforward 
(LCF) 
The firm has a loss carryforward. 0.256 0.437 
Sales Sales of the firm (in million Euro). 64.427 253.493 
Tangibility Fixed and intangible assets of the firm, divided by total 
capital (balance sheet total).  
0.278 0.276 
GDP Growth Current years GDP in the firm’s host country minus last 
years GDP, divided by last years GDP.  
0.034 0.086 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s host country. 1.887 1.876 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in the 
firm’s host country. 
1.140 0.825 
Notes: The number of observations is 8,211. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s research Data and Service Centre (RDSC). Tax var-
iables are obtained from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the annual Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & 
Young. GDP growth, Inflation and Corruption stem from the World Bank. 
 
For the consolidated case, the country specific explanatory variables and the variable indicating 
M&As are the same as in the unconsolidated case (see Table 3), besides that in case of firms 
belonging to the same MNE and country, they are now not considered for single firms, but for 
the group of those firms (considered as one single firm). However, the value of those variables 
for the group is the same as for each firm of the group in the unconsolidated case (since the 
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firms of those groups are in the same country). Besides the debt ratios, also some explanatory 
variables (Loss Carryforward, Sales and Tangibility) differ, since they are now not calculated 
for a single firm but as a minimum outcome (Loss Carryforward) respectively sum (Sales and 
Tangibility) for all firms in the same MNE and country. 
Table 2 and Table 3 also include further variables which are relevant for defining the subsam-
ples in Table 4 and the regressions, since they indicate firms which are located in a country with 
a Group Tax Regime (Group Tax Regime), a thin-capitalization or earnings stripping rule (Thin-
capitalization or earnings stripping rule) or which belong to a holding structure (Holding struc-
ture). 
Table 4 shows the means of the total debt ratio for the consolidated and unconsolidated case, 
which I consider in order to test my hypothesis H-5. I consider all firms (rows (1) and (2)) and 
M&A firms in particular (rows (3) to (12)).  
In the case of all firms, the debt ratio is surprisingly slightly smaller for the consolidated case 
compared to the unconsolidated case (0.499 in row (2) compared to 0.510 in row (1)). However 
– as mentioned in Section 2.2 – this may well be the case, if multiple holding structures of an 
MNE in one country are consolidated. But in case of debt-push-down strategies – as stated 
above – I expect an increase in the debt ratio through the consolidation. In the following rows, 
I consider subsamples where holding structures and therefore higher debt ratios should become 
more likely given my discussion in Section 2. Foremost, holding structures should be more 
likely in case of M&As. Starting from row (3) I will only consider such firms. Here, the debt 
ratio in the consolidated case (row (4)) is at first still smaller than in the unconsolidated case 
(row (3)). So I find no stronger effect for M&A firms in general. In a next step, I further restrict 
my sample to firms in countries with a high tax rate (above the 75%-percentile of all countries). 
Here, the effect of higher consolidated debt ratios is even more likely, also in case of multiple 
holding structures (in countries with a high tax rate the debt ratios should be similar across 
different holding structures). Indeed the consolidated debt ratio (0.518 in row (6)) is slightly 
higher than the unconsolidated debt ratio (0.511 in row (5)). Not surprisingly, this effect be-
comes stronger if I consider only firms belonging to holding structures (0.574 in row (8)), i.e., 
those firms from which the increase stems. I expect this increase to be even larger, if there is a 
group tax regime in the host country of the aggregate (row (10)), since such regimes are neces-
sary for offsetting profits in the holding structures. However, here the consolidated debt ratio 
slightly declines to 0.554. Hence, there may be other factors affecting the debt ratios for which 
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the chosen descriptive statistic do not control for. Finally, the effect should also be stronger if 
there are thin-capitalization rules, which may be circumvented by holding structures. Since in 
my sample, all host countries which have group tax regimes, also have such rules, the effect is 
the same as in the previous sample. I can conclude, that the results support my hypothesis H-5, 
according to which the consolidated debt ratios should be higher than the unconsolidated ones, 
though only for especially relevant samples (i.e., in particular in such subsamples, where only 
those firms, which belong to holding structures, are included). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Regressions on Capital Structures (consolidated case) 
Variable Description Mean 
 
Standard 
Deviation 
CTDR Liabilities of the firm/consolidated liabilities of all firms 
belonging to the same MNE and country, divided by con-
solidated total capital (balance sheet total). 
0.499 0.256 
CIDR Internal liabilities of the firm/consolidated internal liabili-
ties of all firms belonging to the same MNE and country, 
divided by consolidated total capital (balance sheet total). 
0.215 0.232 
CEDR External liabilities of the firm/consolidated external liabili-
ties of all firms belonging to the same MNE and country, 
divided by consolidated total capital (balance sheet total). 
0.284 0.229 
Statutory profit tax rate 
(STR) 
Statutory profit tax rate in the firm’s/group of firms’ (in 
same MNE and country) host country. 
0.270 0.070 
High STR The firm/group of firms (in same MNE and country) is lo-
cated in a country with a tax rate above the 75%-percentile 
of all countries. 
0.218 0.413 
MA Dummy variable, that is equal to one if any firm in the 
same MNE and country has entered the database through 
an M&A by the reporting MNE (and equal to zero if no 
firm in the same MNE and country has entered the data-
base through an M&A, but at least one through greenfield 
investment). 
0.719 0.450 
Group Tax Regime (GT 
Regime) 
The firm/group of firms (in same MNE and country) is lo-
cated in a country with a group tax regime. 
0.714 0.452 
Thin-capitalization or 
earnings stripping rule 
The firm/group of firms (in same MNE and country)  is lo-
cated in a country with a thin-capitalization or earnings 
stripping rule. 
0.826 0.379 
Holding structure The firm/group of firms (in same MNE and country)  is lo-
cated in a country, where it’s MNE has at least one holding 
structure. 
0.162 0.368 
Loss Carryforward 
(LCF; consolidated) 
The firm/at least one firm in the group of firms (in same 
MNE and country) has a loss carryforward. 
0.324 0.468 
Sales (consolidated) Total sales of the firm/group of firms (in same MNE and 
country). 
82.120 307.191 
Tangibility (consoli-
dated) 
Total fixed and intangible assets of the firm/group of firms 
(in same MNE and country), divided by total capital (bal-
ance sheet total).  
0.265 0.256 
GDP Growth Current years GDP in the firm’s/group of firms’ (in same 
MNE and country) host country minus last year’s GDP, di-
vided by last year’s GDP.  
0.034 0.087 
Inflation Inflation rate in the firm’s/group of firms (in same MNE 
and country) host country. 
1.913 1.959 
Corruption Value of World Bank’s Control of Corruption Index in the 
firm’s/group of firms (in same MNE and country) host 
country. 
1.154 0.830 
Notes: The number of observations is 6,442. Firm specific variables are obtained from the Microdatabase Direct 
investment (MiDi) 1999-2014 of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s research Data and Service Centre (RDSC). Tax var-
iables are obtained from IBFD Tax Handbooks and the annual Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides by Ernst & 
Young. GDP growth, Inflation and Corruption stem from the World Bank. 
Table 4: Means of the total debt ratio 
 
Only 
M&A 
firms 
Country 
with a high 
tax rate 
Belonging 
to holding 
structure 
Group tax 
regime 
Thin-capi-
talization 
rule 
Consoli-
dated Mean (row) 
Standart de-
viation 
Number of 
observations 
Number of 
firms/holding 
structures 
Number of 
MNEs 
(1)      No 0.510 (1) 0.264 8,211 2,335 1,086 
(2)      Yes 0.499 (2) 0.256 6,442 1,716 1,086 
(3) x     No 0.501 (3) 0.260 5,983 1,737 799 
(4) x     Yes 0.488 (4) 0.250 4,632 1,243 799 
(5) x x    No 0.511 (5) 0.259 1,462 489 266 
(6) x x    Yes 0.518 (6) 0.239 1,035 310 266 
(7) x x x   No 0.504 (7) 0.266 570 234 85 
(8) x x x   Yes 0.574 (8) 0.196 236 89 85 
(9) x x x x  No 0.503 (9) 0.257 472 200 76 
(10) x x x x  Yes 0.554 (10) 0.196 197 78 76 
(11) x x x x x No 0.503 (11) 0.257 472 200 76 
(12) x x x x x Yes 0.554 (12) 0.196 197 78 76 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct investment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
5. Results 
5.1. Determinants of Holding Structures in the Case of M&As 
In this section I present my results for the empirical analysis as specified in Section 3.  
Table 5: Determinants of Holding Structures 
 (1) (2) 
Dependent Variable Holding (same country) Holding (interm. country) 
   
STR 6.231*** 3.196 
 (2.160) (4.217) 
MA 1.361 1.217 
 (0.990) (1.090) 
STR # MA -3.737 -4.414 
 (2.413) (4.315) 
GT Regime 0.096 -0.727 
 (0.470) (0.547) 
GT Regime # MA 0.383 0.106 
 (0.639) (0.650) 
WhT -3.851 2.258 
 (2.748) (3.414) 
MA # WhT -0.243 -5.089 
 (5.900) (4.413) 
ln(GDP) 0.058 0.096 
 (0.064) (0.129) 
(ln)GDP per Capita 0.180 -0.275 
 (0.195) (0.356) 
Inflation -0.052 0.064 
 (0.055) (0.057) 
Corruption 0.075 0.161 
 (0.099) (0.299) 
Constant -5.955*** -1.747 
 (1.990) (3.717) 
Number of observations 1,842 1,842 
Pseudo R-squared 0.061 0.054 
Wald chi-squared 107.864 96.150 
Chi-squared-test∆ 0.000 0.000 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: ∆p-value reported. The dependent variable is one, if the firm was held by a holding in the same country 
(column (1)) or an intermediary country (column (2)) in the year when it was founded. The standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country level. The regressions include year-specific 
effects. *, ** and *** show significance at the level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
The results support my hypothesis H-1 according to which the tax rate of the host country 
should increase the probability that a firm is held by a holding in the same country. The coeffi-
cient 6.231 (together with the interaction effect with MA of -3.737) translates into a marginal 
effect of 0.434 (at the average of the control variables in the sample), which is also significant 
with a p-value of 0.030. This means that a 10 percentage point increase of the tax rate increases 
the probability that the investment firm is held via a holding in the same country by 4.3 per-
centage points, which yet seems to be a rather small effect. However, I do not find evidence 
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that this effect is particularly strong in case of M&As since the interaction between the tax rate 
and the variable indicating M&A firms is insignificant (though – as mentioned above – it is 
correctly included in the calculation of the marginal effect). Furthermore, I do not find evidence 
for the other hypotheses which are relevant in the context of those two regressions (hypotheses 
H-2 and H-3). Regarding control variables, all effects are insignificant.  
As mentioned above, another way to investigate debt-push-down strategies is by looking at the 
debt ratios. Those results are shown in the following section.  
5.2. Considering Debt-Push-Down Strategies When Analyzing Capital Structure Choices 
The results from the previous regressions slightly indicate that MNEs place debt in particular 
at the level of holdings. In the following I present my results from the analysis where I test, 
whether the financial structures are in line with this finding. I start by investigating my hypoth-
esis H-4. The respective results are shown in Table 6. Here I consider all firms, i.e., not just 
M&A firms. The additional effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio in case of M&A firms is 
measured by the interaction of MA and STR.  
I find a significant positive effect of the tax rate on the external debt ratio (column (3)). Ac-
cording to this result, an increase of the tax rate by 10 percentage points increases the external 
debt ratio by about 2.3 percentage points. However, I do not find corresponding effects for the 
total and internal debt ratio. This is surprising given that other studies have found effects also 
for those debt ratios (see Section 1). One explanation may be the growing importance of thin-
capitalization rules (some countries have introduced such rules rather late such as Netherlands 
or Italy (both in 2004)), which seem to be effective in preventing internal debt financing 
(Büttner et al., 2012). Earlier studies may not have fully captured this effect. Furthermore, I 
find no significant effect for the interaction with the variable MA, which may imply that there 
are no additional effects in case of M&As. However, the coefficient for MA is significantly 
negative in the regressions with the internal and total debt ratio as the dependent variables. This 
finding, which does not seem to be related to the tax rate, may be addressed in further research. 
As a first conclusion, I can state that my results confirm my hypothesis H-4 in so far, as the 
local tax rate has a positive effect on debt financing, however only in case of the external debt 
ratio and not in particular for M&A firms.  
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Table 6: Tax Influence on Capital Structures (unconsolidated debt ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable TDR IDR EDR 
    
STR 0.048 -0.180 0.228*** 
 (0.123) (0.118) (0.084) 
MA -0.089** -0.120*** 0.030 
 (0.042) (0.039) (0.029) 
STR # MA 0.122 0.096 0.026 
 (0.146) (0.129) (0.104) 
LCF 0.095*** 0.074*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Sales 0.020*** -0.006** 0.026*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Tangibility -0.109*** -0.032* -0.077*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
GDP Growth 0.010 0.030 -0.020 
 (0.044) (0.049) (0.036) 
Inflation -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Corruption -0.008 0.000 -0.008* 
 (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Constant 0.467*** 0.342*** 0.125*** 
 (0.036) (0.034) (0.026) 
    
Number of observations 8,211 8,211 8,211 
Number of MNEs 1086 1086 1086 
R-squared 0.543 0.492 0.584 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and parent-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level 
of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Regarding control variables, I would expect a negative effect for LCF (see Section 4) but find 
a significant positive effect. The coefficient for Sales is as expected, since I find a negative 
effect on the internal debt ratio and a positive effect on the external debt ratio. For the latter, 
this implies that in my analysis the effect that larger firms may easier receive debt financing 
presumably outweighs the effect that larger firms may also have tendency to rather use retained 
earnings as a source of financing. The coefficient for Tangibility, which should give a similar 
signal to external lenders as Sales (and where I expect no specific effect on the internal and 
total debt ratio) is however negative in all three columns. The negative effect of Corruption 
(which takes higher values in case of less corruption) is also against the above mentioned ex-
pectations. 
I have already seen in Section 4, that if I consolidate the debt ratios of holding structures, the 
debt ratios are higher at least in particularly relevant subsamples. According to my hypothesis 
H-6 I also expect a stronger effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio if I consolidate firms with 
 23 
 
their holdings in the same country. In addition I assume this increase of the tax sensitivity also 
for internal and external debt financing separately (hypothesis H-7). As can be seen in Table 7, 
the effect of the tax rate on the external debt ratio increases (by about 6 percentage points) and 
there is now also a significantly positive effect on the total debt ratio. Hence I find support for 
my hypothesis H-6 (only in the consolidated case, the effect on the total debt ratio is significant 
at all) and limited evidence for hypothesis H-7, i.e., only regarding external debt financing. 
 Table 7: Tax Influence on Capital Structures (consolidated debt ratios) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
    
STR 0.229* -0.056 0.285*** 
 (0.129) (0.120) (0.095) 
MA -0.112** -0.152*** 0.040 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.032) 
STR # MA 0.172 0.220 -0.048 
 (0.149) (0.136) (0.109) 
LCF 0.081*** 0.060*** 0.021*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Sales 0.008** -0.010** 0.018*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Tangibility -0.006 0.041* -0.047** 
 (0.023) (0.021) (0.019) 
GDP Growth -0.010 0.023 -0.033 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.036) 
Inflation 0.001 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Corruption -0.011* -0.005 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.417*** 0.298*** 0.119*** 
 (0.038) (0.034) (0.029) 
    
Number of observations 6,442 6,442 6,442 
R-squared 0.641 0.583 0.656 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and parent-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level 
of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Furthermore, the variable indicating M&A firms again seems to have a negative effect on the 
internal debt ratio and now also on the total debt ratio. However, the interaction of the tax rate 
with this variable is again insignificant in all three specifications. Hence, I do not find full sup-
port for my hypothesis H-6, which, as all my hypotheses, refers to M&A firms. However, I find 
the expected effect for the overall sample. The effects of the control variables do not change 
considerably, except that the sign for the effect of Tangibility on the internal debt ratio turns 
positive (and the effect on the total debt ratio gets insignificant).  
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For now I can conclude, that my first results indicate that debt financing at the level of holding 
firms is particularly relevant (Table 5) and consolidating financial structures leads to higher 
debt ratios (see Section 4) respectively a higher measured effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio 
(Table 7). 
I would expect, that the increasing tax sensitivity is rather driven by those firms, which are part 
of a holding structure. This subsample is considered in the regressions in Table 8. The coeffi-
cient for the effect of the tax rate on the consolidated external debt ratio again increases con-
siderably (to a value of 0.368). The effect on the total debt ratio turns insignificant again (also 
in the following specifications) and is hence not robust in my analysis. In this specification, I 
also find a significant effect for the variable Inflation. According to my reasoning in Section 4, 
a high inflation (i.e. low interest rates) should increase external borrowing. However, I find the 
opposite sign. 
Table 8: Tax Influence on Capital Structures (consolidated debt ratios; only holding 
structures) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
    
STR 0.361 -0.007 0.368* 
 (0.354) (0.357) (0.217) 
MA -0.187 -0.132 -0.055 
 (0.136) (0.130) (0.090) 
STR # MA 0.630 0.341 0.290 
 (0.450) (0.452) (0.264) 
LCF 0.062*** 0.059*** 0.003 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.011) 
Sales -0.003 -0.029*** 0.026*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Tangibility -0.085 -0.217*** 0.133 
 (0.088) (0.072) (0.082) 
GDP Growth 0.067 0.088 -0.020 
 (0.086) (0.106) (0.081) 
Inflation -0.002 0.005 -0.007* 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
Corruption 0.012 0.015 -0.002 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.015) 
Constant 0.352*** 0.357*** -0.005 
 (0.117) (0.112) (0.084) 
    
Number of observations 1,041 1,041 1,041 
R-squared 0.834 0.729 0.800 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and parent-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level 
of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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As mentioned in Section 3, debt financing at the level of holdings and the usage of the respective 
interest payments for offsetting profits of their subsidiaries in the same country is only possible, 
whenever there is a group tax regime. Therefore I also run separate regressions for firms which 
again belong to holding structures but are now also located in countries with such regimes (Ta-
ble 9). 
Table 9: Tax Influence on Capital Structures (consolidated debt ratios; only holding 
structures; group taxation regime in host country) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
    
STR 0.595 0.052 0.543* 
 (0.507) (0.525) (0.316) 
MA 0.045 -0.030 0.074 
 (0.179) (0.171) (0.123) 
STR # MA 0.039 0.056 -0.018 
 (0.592) (0.591) (0.357) 
LCF 0.076*** 0.079*** -0.004 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) 
Sales -0.003 -0.037*** 0.034*** 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.011) 
Tangibility 0.061 -0.128* 0.189** 
 (0.089) (0.076) (0.089) 
Growth 0.136 0.105 0.031 
 (0.090) (0.116) (0.081) 
Inflation -0.007 0.001 -0.008 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Corruption -0.001 0.004 -0.005 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) 
Constant 0.220 0.346** -0.127 
 (0.163) (0.174) (0.118) 
    
Number of observations 909 909 909 
R-squared 0.839 0.741 0.804 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct invest-
ment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and parent-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in pa-
rentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the level 
of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Indeed the effect on the external debt ratio is considerably more pronounced, implying that a 
10 percentage point increase of the tax rate leads to a 5.4 percentage point increase of the debt 
ratio. As regards control variables, the major change to previous specifications is that now the 
share of tangible assets (measured by the variable Tangibility) has the expected positive effect 
on external borrowing whereas the effect of Inflation again turns insignificant. 
Finally, in Table 10 I consider only such firms, which again belong to a holding structure but 
are now also located in countries with thin-capitalization rules or earnings stripping rules. As 
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mentioned above, holding structures may inter alia be used to circumvent such rules. Again I 
expect a stronger effect of the tax rate on the debt ratio compared to Table 8. Now, the effect 
on the total debt ratio becomes significant in case of M&A firms (with a coefficient of 0.817) 
but the effect of the tax rate on the external debt ratio becomes insignificant. Because of this 
mixed result I abstain from drawing conclusions here. 
Table 10: Tax Influence on Capital Structures (consolidated debt ratios; only holding 
structures; thin-capitalization rules or earnings stripping rules in host country) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable CTDR CIDR CEDR 
    
STR 0.266 -0.058 0.324 
 (0.347) (0.302) (0.251) 
MA -0.233 -0.216* -0.017 
 (0.147) (0.121) (0.112) 
STR # MA 0.817* 0.566 0.251 
 (0.459) (0.416) (0.328) 
LCF 0.053*** 0.040** 0.013 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.012) 
Sales -0.002 -0.031*** 0.029*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) 
Tangibility -0.062 -0.182** 0.120 
 (0.102) (0.074) (0.090) 
GDP Growth 0.081 0.089 -0.008 
 (0.096) (0.113) (0.089) 
Inflation -0.001 0.008 -0.009* 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Corruption 0.027 0.025 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.017) 
Constant 0.356*** 0.392*** -0.035 
 (0.130) (0.098) (0.103) 
    
Number of observations 855 855 855 
R-squared 0.851 0.767 0.819 
Source: Research Data and Service Centre (RDSC) of the Deutsche Bundesbank, Microdatabase Direct in-
vestment (MiDi) 1999-2014. 
Notes: The regressions include year-specific and parent-specific effects. The standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. They are robust and clustered at the country-year level. *, ** and *** show significance at the 
level of 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper, I investigate the influence of tax incentives on the financial structures of M&As 
by MNEs. In case of M&As, purchase prices are often financed by high amounts of debt. From 
a tax perspective, it is beneficial to load the loans particularly on subsidiaries in countries with 
a high tax rate (debt push down). Additionally, I explain that it is often advantageous to place 
the debt at a holding in the country of the target firm, since it allows for debt financing up to 
the purchase price (and not just the amount of total assets). 
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I then investigate this potential tax influence on financial structures set up through M&As using 
a dataset of German MNEs. The analysis was separated into two steps. First, I investigate, 
whether financial considerations and associated tax benefits determine group and in particular 
holding structures. I show that the probability that a firm is held by a holding in the same coun-
try increases with the tax rate. In my empirical investigation, a 10 percentage point increase of 
the statutory profit tax rate increases the probability that the investment firm is held via a hold-
ing in the same country by about 4.3 percentage points. This supports my assumption, that it is 
advantageous for firms to place debt at the level of holdings in order to avoid taxes, but it is a 
rather small effect. However, I find no particularly strong effect in case of M&As.  
In addition, if debt-push-down strategies involve holding structures, I show theoretically that it 
is necessary to consolidate financial structures of operating firms and those holdings which 
leads to higher debt ratios. I find that in the overall sample of firms and also for M&A firms in 
particular the total debt ratio however slightly declines with this consolidation. But if I consider 
M&A firms which belong to holding structures (i.e., for the subsample from which the effect 
of the consolidation stems), I see a considerable increase from the unconsolidated debt ratio 
(50.4 percent of debt relative to total capital) to the consolidated debt ratio (57.4 percent). Ac-
cording to that, I also find that indeed the effect of the tax rate on the external debt ratio in-
creases with such a consolidation (but this effect cannot be found for the internal debt ratio and 
not in a robust way for the total debt ratio). This effect becomes stronger for firms which belong 
to a holding structure and even stronger if there is a group tax regime in the host country. To 
be precise, my results for the unconsolidated case show that an increase of the tax rate by 10 
percentage points increases the debt ratio by 2.3 percentage points. For the consolidated case, 
this effect ranges between 2.9 percentage points (for all firms) and 5.4 percentage points (for 
firms that belong to a holding structure and are located in a country with a group tax regime). 
The stronger effect for the subsamples is as expected because I assume that the increase stems 
from such holding structures and profits of the firms have to be offset with the interest payments 
of the holding firms which requires a group tax regime. Finally, in at least some specifications 
I find a significantly negative effect of whether a firm entered the database through an M&A 
on the internal and total debt ratio as the dependent variables. This topic may be investigated in 
further research.  
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